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SUMMARY: The institution of appeal was one of the fundamental organi-
zational principles of the Ottoman Empire – and of the core institutions of the 
Islamic legal system – and was based on the concept of just rule, namely of legal 
security and universal access to justice for all subjects of the state. The decentraliza-
tion of the Ottoman Empire during the transitional period (17th to 18th century) 
caused a change in the relations between the center and the periphery, where the 
institute of appeal through grievance administration underwent an abrupt expan-
sion, especially after 1742. This paper is, on the one hand, an attempt to analyze 
the expansion process of the institution of appeal along with this institution’s 
actual role within the Ottoman legal system; on the other, the paper strives to 
determine the part appeals played in local proto-political struggles.
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All aspects of how the Ottoman Empire functioned were deeply shaped 
by its vast and diverse territory and the variety of cultures and traditions which 
inhabited it. From the organization of central power to provincial administra-
tions, from its tax system to its military, adapting to ever-changing circum-
stances was one of the constant governing principles of the Ottoman state. The 
1 This paper is the result of research for two projects under the Serbian Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technological Development: ” The Medieval Heritage of the Balkans: Institutions and 
Culture” (proj. № 177003) and the “The Area of Vojvodina in the Context of European History” 
(proj. № 177002). The paper is also an amended and extended version of the eponymous article 
published in the Matica Srpska Proceedings for Social Sciences № 54 (1/2016), pages 37–51.
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Empire’s legal system was a result of these attempts to lay the foundations for 
successfully ruling a heterogeneous country. The basis of this legal system was 
Islamic religious law – Sharia law – which certainly enjoyed unquestionable 
prestige within the ideology of the state. In theory, the state authorities were 
entitled to only implement and preserve, not change or amend, this legal corpus 
– whose sources were Islam’s Holy Book, the Quran, and the Sunnah or tradition 
of the prophet Muhammad’s practices and sayings. In addition, the Ottomans 
also accepted legal analogies and unanimous conclusions by legal experts 
among the fundamentals of their religious law. Therefore, only individuals with 
a theological-legal education – the ulama2 – were authorized to interpret Sharia 
law. Islamic law recognizes four traditional schools of interpreting Sharia law, 
all of which were mutually equal: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali, named 
after the distinguished legal experts who founded them. Muslims in the Empire 
were free to choose legal counsel from any of these four schools. The Hanafi 
school, however, was officially recognized by the state and its legal interpreta-
tions were applied in kadi courts. This was because Hanafi legal experts were 
somewhat more flexible in interpreting certain legal provisions, such as the 
status of non-Muslims.
According to the view on law espoused during the time when Sharia 
provisions were being formulated, the first question to be asked was always 
whether or not an action or relation was contrary to the religious or moral code. 
If there was no such conflict, then legal technicalities were of little importance 
to the faithful. From the very beginning, this allowed the possibility of adopt-
ing, and later adapting, legal provisions and administrative institutions from 
areas which gradually succumbed to Muslim rule, while also enabling teh 
creation of new legal solutions through consensus [Schacht 1982: 19–20, 65–71; 
Imber 2002: 216–225]. Islamic legal experts invested enormous efforts in in-
terpreting different legal provisions, frequently debating fictitious cases which 
were unlikely to ever happen. This made it possible to find ways for certain 
practices, which could be deemed contrary to Sharia law, to be wrapped in an 
acceptable legal framework. Examples of this are interest collection and the 
particularly important question of evidence in criminal proceedings [Gerber 
1994: 15–16]. The latter namely pertained to formalizing the use of written 
documents as evidence, given that Sharia law gave absolute advantage to oral 
testimony. Because of this, participants in lawsuits aimed to secure witnesses 
who would confirm the veracity of the information written in documents [Gerber 
1994: 37–38, 47–48; Ergene 2004: 473‒474]. Another important kind of witness 
– unique to the Muslim courtroom – were witnesses of the judiciary act itself 
(şuhud ul-hal). The şuhud ul-hal were not present to offer a testimony regard-
ing the case before the kadi, but instead to ensure that the legal proceedings 
were properly conducted and to vouch for this by having their names recorded 
following the judicial ruling. Moreover, since kadis were officials appointed 
2 The ulama (sing. alim) is the collective term for individuals educated in Islamic theology, and 
who were entitled to work as teachers, kadis (magistrates), legal experts and religious dignitaries. 
Given that they were paid for their services by the state, they were exempt from taxes i.e. belonged 
the class of asker. [Ágoston 2009: 577–578]
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by the central authorities for a specific period, they had limited knowledge of 
local circumstances; thus, the presence of both local dignitaries and people 
knowledgeable about the case being presented, aided the operation of the courts. 
Non-Muslims were also allowed to serve as şuhud ul-hal in instances when the 
kadi deemed it necessary [Jennings 1978a: 143–145; Jennings 1979: 162; Ergene 
2003: 25–30; Крешић 2014: 28–33].
As previously emphasized, the legal system of Islamic states did not exclu-
sively consist of Sharia law, but rather allowed secular law to evolve parallel 
to religious law, with the latter providing the overarching legal framework. 
This secular law – or kanun – developed in combination with traditional legal 
provisions from the pre-Islamic period. Continuing the practice of previous 
Islamic states, the Ottomans only furthered this system. The ruler created new 
laws which did not replace but merely supplemented Sharia law. The adoption of 
various legal and judicial traditions from the peoples they conquered gradually 
increased the complexity of the Ottomans’ legal system. This constant adaptation 
of the judiciary enabled more efficient rule, and enhanced adaptability to the 
diverse circumstances throughout the state. It should be noted that certain legal 
provisions from conquered states found their way into the Ottoman legal system, 
and that the Ottoman authorities allowed a judicial autonomy of sorts for its 
non-Muslim subjects. 
Zimmis3 were allowed to resolve disputes either by reaching an agreement 
or by taking their case to a church court or a rabinnical court. Of course, this 
was on condition that no Muslim was involved in the dispute; otherwise, the 
case had to be brought before a kadi. It is important to stress that within the 
Islamic legal framework the state automatically launched court proceedings 
only for so-called crimes against God (hudud). Mostly, these involved religious 
violations and pertained to zimmis mainly in cases of theft or armed robbery. 
All other infractions were seen as private disputes between two sides, hence 
settling a dispute through agreement was quite widespread. Even so, Zimmis 
did not always use the privilege of settling disputes on their own, appealing to 
kadis even when it was not required – a practice that can been explained in 
several ways. Firstly, as a state institution the kadi court could, at least in 
theory, guarantee that its decisions – unlike an agreement reached within a 
community – would be implemented by the central authorities. Also, the prac-
tice of recording and issuing written confirmation of a kadi rulings facilitated 
the process of providing evidence should another dispute arise over the same 
issue. In addition, Zimmis would occasionally conclude that applying Sharia 
law would ensure a more favorable outcome for their case. [Jennings 1978a: 
250–255; Gradeva 1997: 40–41, 57–62; Al-Qattan 1999: 432–436; Kermeli 2012: 
347–351] Karen Barkey, however, notes that “the image of multiple autonomous 
court systems is inaccurate because the policy of legal pluralism was organized 
3 The term zimmis (or dhimmis) refered to members of monotheistic religions who recognized 
the authority of Muslim rulers and payed a special tax (the jizya tax). In return, the state protected 
them, their property and their personal and religious freedom. However, by imposing numerous 
restrictions, rules of conduct and dress codes, the state made it apparent that zimmis were not equal 
to other Muslim subjects [Фотић 2005: 27–71].
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and controlled by the center, with the goal of presenting diverse options while 
protecting the kadi court’s topmost position.” This ensured the autonomy of 
different communities and also allowed the firmly set interreligious barriers 
to be crossed when needed [Barkey 2013: 84, 93–94].
The kadi court was the most important institution for implementing legal 
provisions. With their education in theology and law and authority granted by 
the state, kadis were entitled to provide rulings based on both religious and 
secular law. Although abuses were possible, kadis were, in theory, guaranteed full 
autonomy from the provincial – and central – authorities; orders from Istanbul 
could only mandate a retrial or transfer of a case to a different kadi – not dictate 
how a kadi should rule. [Heyd 1967: 10–11; Jennings 1978b: 138–142; Ginio 1998: 
191–200; Imber 2002: 216–225] Kadis were tasked with more than presiding 
over legal proceedings. Each order sent to the province had to be entered into 
the sicil – a special kind of registry kept by the local kadi. As mentioned above, 
the kadi also recorded all his rulings in the sicil, as well as every contract con-
cluded in court. Kadis had ties to the provincial administration and its officials, 
especially with regards to keeping local order, supplying the army, maintaining 
roads and fortifications and collecting taxes [Gradeva 1999: 179–187].
Such diverse and broad authority lent the kadi court a special position 
among state institutions and made it a kind of symbol of state authority among 
the sultan’s subjects. By merging state, legal and religious authority, kadis 
became the key intermediaries between the central authorities and the provincial 
population. Given that the concept of justness was critical to a ruler’s legiti-
macy in the Ottoman Empire, it is apparent that kadis both symbolically and 
practically enabled the ruler’s authority to be implemented in the provinces. 
Islamic philosophical theory specifically highlighted the importance of each 
person and social group (the army, ulema, re’aya4) having a clearly defined 
place within the state, the ruler’s responsibility being to ensure their safety and 
wellbeing through just rule. The ruler could not rule without the army’s might, 
while the army, in turn, could not exist without wealth; this wealth was produced 
by the reaya, thanks to just rule; the rule of justice was impossible without har-
mony – predicated on the rule of religious law, which, in turn, was fundamen-
tally based on the sultan’s rule. This interrelationship constituted to so-called 
circle of justice, one of the basic tenets of Islamic political ideology. Legitimizing 
the sultan’s rule in this way was particularly important in the Ottoman Empire 
because the House of Osman – despite various attempts to fabricate heritage 
– did not boast any ties to previous Islamic ruling families or the prophet Mu-
hammed. Hence the need to underscore the efficiency and strength of the 
sultan’s rule as the basis for his authority [Aksan 1993: 53–55; Gerber 1994: 
63–64; Karateke 2005: 18–23; Hagen 2005: 65–66; Barkey 2013: 90–91].
In a system where the ruler was the main protector and enforcer of justice, 
the institution of appeal had a naturally significant role. Drawing from Is-
lamic tradition, but tribal heritage as well, every subject, regardless of their 
religion, social group or location within the Empire, was guaranteed the right 
4 In the Ottoman Empire, the term re’aya was used to denote all imperial subjects who paid 
taxes and were not part of state institutions. [Faroqhi 1995: 403–406]
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to bring a request or plea before the sultan himself [Karateke 2005: 38–39]. 
This could be done in person, by traveling to Istanbul, or by a written petition 
called arz-ı hal. Each petition passed through a bureaucratic appartus which 
checked its information against documents available in the central archives 
and then forward it usually to the Imperial Divan5 or, in exceptional occasions, 
to the sultan himself. An order was issued based on all the collected data and 
sent most commonly to the kadi in whose jurisdiction the petitioner lived.
During the late transitional period (the mid-18th century), the appellate 
system swiftly expanded to such proportions that it is often considered not an 
institute of appeals in the classic sense but rather a completely new institution 
– the ahkâm administration. The question is whether this occurred due to in-
creased local pressure or because the central authorities introduced the new 
system as a fresh means of legitimizing themselves in the eyes of their subjects 
during a time of decentralization. Since imperial visibility needed to be ensured 
in any way possible, the enhanced appellate system could be seen as yet an-
other invention of the central government. On the other hand, appeals were 
increasingly used to provide legitimacy for those defeated in battling the ruling 
regime locally. The appeals process in the Ottoman Empire has yet to be thor-
oughly and systematically studied. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
leading 20th-century scholars in Ottoman studies Halil İnalcık and Suraiya 
Faroqhi insisted that such research would be of global value, yet their opinion 
met little interest until the early 21st century. Initially, it was believed that the 
expansion of the ahkâm administration was caused by patrimonialism or, as 
defined by Fatma and Ramazan Acun, an extreme form of patrimonialism 
called sultanism. Over time, theories proposing a centralized bureaucracy that 
strived to develop methods for controlling the Empire’s territory were gradu-
ally abandoned. In their stead arose notions that Ottoman appellate policies 
where shaped by judiciousness or were even an expression of pragmatic rule. 
There were several diplomatic forms of şikâyet registers, including ahkâm 
registers 6. First, as İnalcık points out, there were arz-ı hal or original appeals, 
which were mostly submitted to a kadi, or one was at least so supposed. Early 
ahkâm registers, dating from the 16th century, significantly differ from later 
ones (post-1742) in both diplomatic and paleographical traits. [Acun 2007: 
125–131; İnalcık 1988: 33–54] In addition, the purpose of the later registers had 
also somewhat changed. While the underlying goal of asserting the legitimacy 
of the authorities remained, two new elements arose: the need to control pro-
vincial factions and the increased importance of bureacracy. The latter is a 
well-known issue in Ottoman studies, but the ahkâm administration’s expan-
sion was never linked to the strenghtening of the position of the reis ül-küttâb7, 
5 The Imperial Divan was the highest governing body of the Ottoman Empire. Sources also 
mention the synonyms Sublime Porte or Imperial Council. As of the late 18th century, the term 
Sublime Porte referred to the office of the grand vizier, while Imperial Council was used for other 
institutions of state government which had their own divan, such as the beylerbey, sancakbeyi, and 
the ağa of the Janissaries.
6 Registers of the Ottoman grievance administration. 
7 Literally ’chief of scribes’ or ’head clerk’. (Translator’s note)
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who was directly charged with controlling these affairs. During the second half 
of the 18th century, the institution of reis became a recruiting station for the 
highest positions in the Ottoman government and was virtually a mandatory 
stepping-stone for any future vizier. Political struggles surrounding this key 
position intensified over time, while the offices within the Porte began increasing 
the complexity of their protocols and, more importantly, began bureaucratic 
expansion8. The principle of justness served as an excellent mechanism for 
highlighting the importance of a bureaucratic process which began inventing 
tradition. In the early 16th century there was hardly a single grievance filed in 
the Sancak of Semendire, while an average of one – four at most – arrived 
annually from the sancaks of Rumeli. [Acun 2007: 135–136] By the mid-18th 
century, however, the number of appeals from Semendire was no less than 
twenty a year – reaching as many as fifty – while there were over one thousand 
appeals from the Rumeli region annually. So far, historiography has not yet 
examined the causal relationship between the expansion of the appellate system 
and the bureaucratization of the Ottoman government. Although archival ma-
terials are an often unrelieable ally and are frighteningly unforthcoming when 
it matters most, one gains the impression that despite all the prerogatives of 
apsolute power in a sancak granted to a vizier, the central authorities nevertheless 
managed to develop mechanisms of indirect control. As Nora Lafi concludes, 
the ahkâm administration enabled direct contact between the urban elite and 
central administration. [Lafi 2011: 73-82]. What demands further examination 
is whether there existed direct contact between the local bureaucracies and 
central apparatus where part of the local administration directly or indirectly 
served the interests of the central authorities.
The upsurge in appeals coincides with the most pronounced degree of 
decentralization on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, especially in Rumelia. 
These turbulent times – marked by riots, the overthrows of local governments 
and political clashes between various groups over the positions of vizier and 
vali9 – demonstrate that launching the complex process of appeal could not be 
a personal, independent initiative, because every complaint meant challenging 
the authorities, the vizier and, even more dangerously, their representatives in 
the local community, where human life held less value and was easily lost 
before an appeal even left the province. The system obviously ensured safety 
for itself. This reflects a certain complexity of both local relations and relations 
between the center and periphery. In a system where local authorities had 
absolute local power, it would seem impossible for any complaint to be lodged 
without some kind of patronage – because any complaint was necessarily 
against the executives of local government, who increasingly controlled the 
kadi i.e. the only person who could, according to the Ottoman understanding of 
8 The entire grievance administration, as well as registers of the imperial orders (mühimme) 
were under the purview of the Beylikçi office (officially known as the Divan-ı Hümayun Kalemi) 
[Ahıshalı 2001].
9 During this period sancakbeyis were called viziers and beylerbeys were called valis. The 
term pasha is frequently found in colloquial use for both of these Ottoman provincial leadership 
positions. A pashalik was the jurisdiction of a pasha.
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Islamic law, overturn a court ruling. Individual appeals frequently masked the 
interests of a more powerful patron, whose interests were somehow threatened 
and who pressured the bureaucratic process by having his sattelites file numer-
ous individual complaints. In most cases, an individual was protected in chal-
lenging a segment of the government merely by belonging to a group (sipahi, 
Janissaries, yerli10, etc.). Every such public action represented an invocation of 
the principle of group visibility, a form of political representation for the group 
where the actual outcome of the appeal was frequently of little importance to 
those who lodged it. At the same time, it should be noted that it was just as 
common for the interests of individuals to be served under the protection of a 
group. The numerous appeals filed by sipahi (and even zaims) demanding new 
estates due to the depopulation of their previous ones cannot be viewed as an 
initiative of individuals independent of politics. Namely, because this practice 
became widespread and evolved into a bureaucratic mechanism of influence. 
Although it may so seem from individual documents, the sipahis’ petitions did 
not constitute independent cases but were rather part of a mechanism which 
guaranteed them certain rights tied to their status. The policy of the central 
government, which sought to create a system that would guarantee that timar 
dues be paid, was a central issue between the center and periphery. Tax registers 
shows that it was impossible to meet projected farming outputs, but the ahkâm 
registers indicates the existence of an entire land administration and a compli-
cate bureaucratic mechanism formed to strengthen the sipahi locally. [TKGM. 
TADB. TTD. No. 17; No. 18]. Given that the sipahi were a realiable opposition 
to local power structures, it is likely that the central authorities supported the 
group whereby they directly meddled in the periphery’s proto-political con-
flicts. By weakening the legitimate ruling strucutres in provinces, the central 
powers curtailed the periphery’s independence while at once casting themselves 
in the role of necessary supreme arbiter.
Recently, the overt state-centered perspective in Ottoman studies has been 
criticised, in light of which the appeals system must also be considered in terms 
of the provinces’ attempts to act independently of the central authorities. By 
recognizing the autonomy of these actions, even as mere initiatives sent to the 
central government, one raises the issue of the proto-civil society as defined 
by Antonis Anastasopoulos. Acknowledging the sociological aspect of this 
term, historians have adopted Jürgen Kocka’s definition, whereby civil society 
represents a particular kind of social action. [Kocka 2004: 68–69] From this 
perspective, the Ottoman Empire’s subjects are viewed through the prism of 
their actions – which are considered authonomous. Firstly, this undermines the 
paradigm in which the centre is omnipotent and controls the provinces’ every 
10 Sipahi were soldiers, predominantly cavalry, who received the right to collect income from 
an estate called a timar in exchange for military service. Janissaries were members of the standing 
army, trained by the state and deployed as needed across imperial provinces. By the 18th century, 
sipahi nearly lost any military significance, while, thanks to their constant increase in number, 
Janissaries ceased being elite troops recruited through the devşirme and became an important 
political factor. On the other hand, yerli were units comprised of provincial populace drafted by 
the provincial authorities. [Imber 2002: 252–286]
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action, and everything the periphery does is reduced to an elicited reaction. It 
becomes no longer possible to see the Ottoman bureaucratical appartus as a 
long arm of the government or supreme arbiter. The socio-political changes 
precipitated by the decentralization process in turn led to the emergence of 
para-governmental structures, whereby the balance of power was constantly 
prone to shifts. Certain groups frequently masked their actions under the seeming 
legitimacy of the old system, whose place they assumed sometimes legally, 
sometimes less so. What is clear is that these groups had far more autonomy 
than was believed before. The members of the administrative system employed 
the existing institutional framework merely to cloak their own political agendas. 
The more a power structure – no matter how marginally local – constituted a 
true simulacrum, the more important it became to assert its legitimacy. It is no 
coincidence that political activity is so closely tied to the concept of legitimacy, 
as Suraiya Faroqhi suggests. Therefore, the very manner in which appeals were 
launched and led indicates the social significance of this institution. It is highly 
unlikely that those submitting petitions to the sultan believed that justice would 
be served. Anyone acquainted with the Ottoman legal system knows that a 
court of higher instance could not change a ruling but merely suggest it be 
reconsidered. This leads one to conclude that appeals were merely a form of 
political demonstration, aimed at ensuring additional legitimacy during court 
proceedings – and pressuring the local kadi and all stakeholders into action. 
The way in which the appeals system was somewhat institutionalized shows 
that the process of political activity in pre-political societies was dependent not 
only on local conflicts but also on the autonomous actions of social formations 
that could change their social status and political role. The circumstances in 
which these processes originated are called the proto-civil society, and its 
formations are in keeping with Kocka’s definition based on the principle of 
self-organization [Faroqhi 1992: 1–39; Anastasopoulos 2012: 440–450].
In the context of analyzing social formations, it is important to consider 
Michael Mann’s thesis according to which society constitutes “multiple over-
lapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power.” While it is empha-
sized that society should be analyzed as an autonomous formation, it is also 
necessary to avoid a unitarian approach since society is neither a system nor a 
totality. One should cease to view local communities as a monolith reacting to 
stimuli from the central government, and instead see them as social actors 
which not only act autonomously but initiate historical processes. [Mann 1986: 
1–2] As Boğaç Ergene underlines, individuals join various networks of power, 
which provide a social matrix of interests and alliances based upon them. 
Ergene points out it is impossible for administrative formations to exist outside 
of a certain social consensus. More importantly, Ergene maintains that the 
legitimacy of the kadis had to be based on communal approval of their actions – 
just as prominent locals could not remain beyond the structures of the authorities. 
Similar interpretations open the possibility of approaching the appeals system 
as a specificity indicator for social conflicts caused by the political battles of 
various power networks. As Eleni Gara notes, by 1770 the system of political 
representation by ayan or kocabaşıs reached such a level that it was necessary 
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to invent tradition. The strengthening of political elites caused conflicts to 
escalate so much that it is usually impossible to discern where political protests 
stopped and where fractionalism began [Ergene 2012: 391‒394; Gara: 412, 
416‒417]. 
Filing an appeal began with hiring an educated person to first compose 
the appeal. While it was necessary to pay for this service, it was not difficult 
to find legal experts given that petitions were filed by the denizens of cities 
and towns. Educated experts roamed the provinces in search of work due to a 
shortage of postitions within the administration. Appeals were also frequently 
composed by mollas, given that they were esteemed legal scholars. The appeal 
itself could be presented to the Imperial Divan in person or it could be sent as 
a letter/appeal (mektup/arzuhal) with the proper escort, which certainly made 
the entire process more expensive. The form of delivery was noted in the ahkâm 
registers themselves, with either sent (mektub gönderüb/ arzuhal edüb) or 
received (gelüb). The original documents were archived in special şikâyet archives, 
while response outlines were entered into ahkâm registers, which were kept after 
1742, according to a province, i.e. eyalet, of provenance. There is significant 
difference between the terms letter and arzuhal. The former was composed by 
a learned expert outside of the legal system, while the latter was issued by a kadi. 
Securing a kadi’s agreement to enter a complaint into a sicil – judicial protocol 
– was certainly more difficult but also important in terms of legitimacy and 
political rivalry. Examples of this are not rare. As Demetrios Papastamatiou 
suggests, the local kadi need not have necessarily been the one to issue an 
arzuhal: instead, stakeholders could approach a neighboring kaza, thus fanning 
local rivalries. Narrative sources claim that control of kadi’s office was absolute 
– which itself should be accepted with reservations – yet those same narrative 
sources claim that the position of kadi was practically auctioned off to the high-
est bidder for a given time period. The fact that the office of kadi was rented out 
allowed kadis more maneuvering space, since they could disregard the power 
of the vizier and focus on local circumstances instead. Clearly, viziers controlled 
the provinces via müsellim and subaşı11, but a kadi could lend legitimacy to 
complaints and the appeals process itself [Papastamatiou 2012: 172]. 
The appeals lodged with the Imperial Divan all followed a similar legal 
and bureaucratic format, highlighting injustice and oppression (zülm) as the 
reasons for addressing the state’s highest legal institution. In fact, each com-
plaint is merely a reiteration of certain frequently used phrases requesting 
intervention, which cannot be interpreted beyond the context of bureaucratic 
practice, formalized address and citing an official, legal cause further elabo-
rated in the body of the letter. Any petition to the Imperial Divan was predi-
cated on an assumed injustice, for which legal sanctions were requested. Unlike 
older documents – which put emphasis on one of two very different terms, 
Sharia law and the kanun – appeals from the transitional period referred equally 
to both religious and secular law, using them in conjunction to denote a unified 
11 A müsellim was a local administrative official subordinate to the vizier; a subaşı was an 
administrative-police officer in smaller settlements appointed by the vizier.
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legal system. Particularly interesting are the Divan’s responses to the com-
plaints. Open interference in provincial issues was rare. Instead, orders were 
issued using the formulation to prevent and prohibit interference /in said issue/ 
it is honorably ordered that (müdahale ettirilüb men’ ü def’12 olunmak babında 
emr-i şerifi) or, similarly, to prevent and prohibit upsetting (ta’addileri men’ ü 
def’ olunmak babında hükm-i hümayunum), outside interference, tyranny and 
injustice are prohibited (ahardan dahl olunmak icab etmez, zülm ü ta’addi). 
The Divan declaratively prohibited infractions against the legal system but 
generally did not interfere in individual cases, assigning the task instead to the 
local kadi: /let that/ which is unlawful be considered in keeping with Sharia 
law and /let/ the law be maintained (mahallinde şer’ile görilüb ihkak-ı hak 
olduğu). The independence of the kadi’s office could easily have been an excuse 
for the higher authorities to do nothing. During earlier periods in Ottoman legal 
history, it was much more frequent for the Divan to interfere significantly in 
local affairs and to annul a kadi’s ruling. A particularly sensitive subgroup of 
appeals referred to the oppression of someone in power or instance of abuse of 
institutional power. These actually were extreme cases of injustice, especially 
if the complaint was lodged by local commoners – the re’aya. While the docu-
ments most frequently employ the formulations zülm and injustice13, injustice 
and injury (ta’addi ve rencide), complaints against power abuse also used the 
quite strong term legal repression (hak-ı müzalem). It seems that the central 
government lacked an efficient mechanism for controlling the entire appeals 
process and that, as a result, any attempt it made to offer support was reduced 
to mere declarations. An order sent to the province, however, could strongly 
contribute to an appeal’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local administration and 
in further administrative proceedings [Павловић 2017: 328; BOA. A. DVNS. 
AHKR. d. 3/820]. Rarely, a mübaşir was appointed – a representative of the 
state tasked with further investigating the case. Cases which drew special at-
tention from both the state and local authorities were problems regarding timar 
estates. At least one-third of all complaints lodged [during the transitional 
period] referred to the issue of so-called small timars (erbab-ı timar), where 
an intervention by the authorities was a given. This was expected, on the one 
hand, because the issue was within the purview of the central administration 
– which assigned timars. If a sipahi-timariot could not achieve the projected 
returns from his timar, which was determined from the tax registers – the 
ahkâm administration exchanged timars. It is unknown how efficient this ap-
proach was, especially considering that the sipahi were no longer considered 
formal members of the military, but rather a social group rewarded with a very 
low rent for their timars – which was frequently difficult to collect in full. 
Particularly sensitive were cases of usurpation, where a sipahi complained that 
his rights, granted by a certain document, were usurped. Aside from the issue 
of timars, such appeals – filed by beratlı or persons owning documents con-
firming their status or rights which were violated (regardless of the kind of 
12 Frequently accompanied by another synonym: ta’arrüz.
13 Frequently accompanied by the synonym gadr (injustice, tyranny).
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document and rights it granted) – were met with positive responses that were 
conveyed to the local administration in the same manner as all others. In other 
words, the Divan would determine that the rights cited were indeed violated 
and then order the local government to take action in accordance with the law, 
whatever that may be. Two interesting paradoxes bear mentioning: affirmative 
responses and the simplicity of bureauractic langauge [BOA. A. DVNS. AHKR. 
d. 6/922, 6/456. 6/145, 6/148].
Generally speaking, political initiatives of the time could be categorized 
into those made by members of the ruling group (askeri) and those by the local 
populace (re’aya). The former comprise two basic types: a member of the rul-
ing class, usually a member of the military, lodges an appeal either because he 
cannot fully realize his right to a certain privilege (income from a timar, tax 
farms) or because his rights have been completely usurped (timar seizures, 
financial fraud, inheritance issues etc.). These two types of cases seemingly 
have no correlation and should be analyzed separately. The many possible issues 
with inheritance actually bear no direct link to a person’s proprietary-legal 
status. The relatives of a deceased person who invested in business in the province 
would request a return of assets neglecting the fact that the deceased was a 
member of the Janissaries and that, therefore, his life and property belonged 
to the state. The problem was the status of Janissary, which numerous merchants 
and entrepreneurs held nominally for the sake of social privilege and tax ex-
emption. The heirs of such individuals did not expect the state administration 
to strictly abide by the kanun in these cases. The inability to fully collect 
money – be it income from a timar or tax farming – mostly led to individual 
cases and private lawsuits. The complete usurpation of these rights, however, 
was possible only with the permission of local authorties. The fundamental 
battleground, thus, became the timar, but also taxes farmed through the iltizām 
system14. Given that the taxation system operated by farming taxtion rights 
via auction, cash flows originated when farming rights were bought or when 
loans for tax farms were issued. The group of privileged power holders accused 
in appeals of abuse of power, zülm and tyranny grew increasingly noticeable, 
acting brazenly even in the presence of local kadis. This group acted on orders 
(buyuruldu) of the local government, the vizier and the Belgrade Divan. In the 
Ottoman legal system, documents issued by the central authorities in theory 
held precedence over those issued by the local administration, but provincial 
appeals were the result of this rule being neglected. In the provinces, buyuruldu 
were accepted as absolutes, which led to legal chaos and increased legal un-
certainty. The lodging of these appeals testifies to direct opposition against 
the regime for the purpose of seizing power in a regime change. The defeated, 
therefore, aimed their political activity toward securing a position in some 
future government. [BOA. A. DVNS. AHKR. d. 11/560].
In addition to initiatives launched by the ruling class, it is also important 
to consider the intiatives of the local populace. As in the case of the former, 
14 The Ottoman taxation system during the transitional period was based on the farming of 
public revenue, the rights to which were auctioned to the highest bidder either temporarily (mukata’a) 
or for life (malikâne). 
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individual initiatives were the result of support from a more powerful group 
or institution. Namely, in such cases a headman (knez) – an elder tasked with 
collecting tax money and submitting it to tax farmers – was behind the peti-
tioner. Any abuse of the iltizām system directly cost the headmen, which is 
why they had established communication channels with the central government 
via the institution of appeals. Most likely, this was the job of a professional 
group of representatives who took appeals before the Imperial Divan once they 
received the proper signal from the field i.e. the headmen. Although the docu-
ments themselves bear the names of the peasants damaged, the cases were 
actually handled by “semi-professional representatives”. The most common 
problem cited by the representatives of the local populace was debt, or spe-
cifically the system of collective waranty and taxation abuse, namely over-
taxation. The appearance of the re’aya and its representatives in the ahkâm 
administration demonstrates that this social class recognized the significance 
of this administrative mechanism and used it to fight for its own visibility. 
[BOA. A. DVNS. AHKR. d. 22/536; 22/552; 22/618].
The appeals system of the Ottoman Empire represents an institution of 
Islamic law in the context of system where justness was the ruler’s fundamental 
duty. This institution, however, underwent expansion during the late transitional 
period, when the process of decentralization led to new forms of communica-
tion between the center and periphery. According to the theory of empires, it can 
be concluded that negotiations of a sort yielded an innovative mechanism for 
the center’s control over the periphery, be it only in asserting the legitimacy 
of the authorities and legality of institutions and informal groupings. For local 
petitioners, appeals served as a channel for achieving representation of their 
own identities in the fight to join the ranks of the ruling class. The interference 
of the central authorities in these processes served to maintain the illusion of 
imperial control and imperial presence in the periphery, which the center could 
no longer effectively control. By determining common interests, the subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire shaped a mechanism of communication which enabled 
them to achieve their own goals and interests via a new form of negotiation 
with the center of the Empire.
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